Article V Convention: Frequently Asked Questions

The Basics

What is an Article V Convention?

It is the second method the Constitution provides for proposing amendments. If 34 state legislatures apply to Congress, Congress must call a convention; any amendment it proposes still requires ratification by 38 states.

Is a constitutional convention the same as an Article V convention?

No. A "constitutional convention" usually means the 1787 Philadelphia Convention, which wrote the Constitution from scratch. An Article V Convention can only propose amendments within the existing framework, and those amendments still need 38 states to ratify.

Can states force Congress to hold a constitutional convention?

Yes. If 34 state legislatures submit applications, Article V says Congress "shall" call a convention. Hamilton confirmed in Federalist 85 that this language is peremptory and leaves Congress no discretion.

How many states are needed to call an Article V convention?

Thirty-four state legislatures must apply to Congress. After a convention proposes an amendment, 38 states must ratify it, meaning a single chamber in each of just 13 states can block any proposal.

Has the US ever had a constitutional convention since 1787?

No. The 1787 Philadelphia Convention is the only federal constitutional convention in U.S. history. An Article V Convention for proposing amendments has never been called, though several campaigns have come within one or two states of the threshold.

How close are we to an Article V convention?

The exact count depends on contested legal questions about whether applications on different topics can be aggregated and whether old applications have expired. The fiscal-integrity campaign has roughly 28 active applications, and the Convention of States project continues to push in additional states, but both remain short of 34.

What happens after an Article V convention proposes an amendment?

The proposed amendment goes to the states for ratification. Congress decides whether ratification happens through state legislatures or specially called state conventions, and three-fourths (38 states) must approve it.

Procedure and Law

Can an Article V convention be limited to one topic?

This is the most contested question in Article V law and is unresolved. Most commentators agree that state applications must address the same issue to be aggregated, but whether the convention itself can be confined once convened is debated.

Do all state applications have to say the same thing?

No. They need to address the same general issue but do not need identical language. This standard is called issue congruency.

Can a state take back its application for a convention?

The legal effect of rescission is unresolved. Most proposed congressional legislation allowed it before the 34-state threshold was met, and 17 states rescinded previous applications between 1988 and 2010.

How long does a state's convention application last?

There is no settled answer. Most proposed legislation set a seven-year window, but FOAVC argues applications never expire, pointing to the 27th Amendment which was ratified 203 years after it was proposed.

Does the president have to approve a constitutional amendment?

No. The president has no role in the amendment process and cannot veto a proposed amendment. This has been settled law since the Supreme Court's 1798 decision in Hollingsworth v. Virginia.

Do state governors have a role in the Article V Convention process?

The dominant view is no. Article V specifies applications from "legislatures," and a 1974 ABA report confirmed most states exclude the governor, though historically some applications were sent to governors and signed.

Who picks the delegates to an Article V convention?

The Constitution does not say. Congress has historically claimed authority to set delegate selection procedures, but this has never been tested. Most proposed legislation gave states significant control over choosing their delegates.

How does the convention vote?

The Constitution does not specify. The dominant view is one state, one vote. Proposed rules require 36 states to support any amendment before it can be proposed.

What role does Congress play in an Article V Convention?

Congress must call the convention once 34 states apply. It has historically claimed broader authority over procedures, delegate selection, and rules, but none of that has ever been tested in practice.

What is the prodding effect?

When states apply for a convention to pressure Congress into proposing an amendment itself rather than letting a convention happen. The 17th Amendment (direct election of senators) is the most successful example.

Risks and Safeguards

Is the runaway convention threat real?

The risk exists in theory, since courts are unlikely to stop a convention from deliberating broadly. But any amendment a convention proposes still needs ratification by 38 states, meaning just 13 states can block anything extreme, and delegate-binding mechanisms upheld by the Supreme Court's 2020 Electors Cases add an additional layer of control.

Could a constitutional convention rewrite the entire Constitution?

An Article V Convention is not a constitutional convention. It can only propose amendments, and any amendment it proposes must still be ratified by 38 states before it takes effect.

What stops a convention from going rogue?

Three safeguards: the 38-state ratification requirement means 13 states can veto any proposal, proposed convention rules require 36 states to agree before anything is sent out, and the Supreme Court's Electors Cases confirm that states can legally bind and replace delegates who defy their instructions.

Can convention delegates be forced to vote a certain way?

Yes. The Supreme Court's 2020 Electors Cases held that states can bind presidential electors and remove those who break their pledge. The same legal principle applies to Article V Convention delegates, meaning states can require delegates to follow the results of a citizen assembly or popular vote.

What do the Chiafalo and Baca Supreme Court cases have to do with Article V?

Those cases established that states can bind and replace presidential electors who defy their pledge. Since electors are constitutionally created officers and can still be bound, convention delegates, who have no stronger claim to independence, can be bound as well.

What is a citizen assembly and could it work in the US?

A citizen assembly is a randomly selected, representative group of ordinary people brought together to deliberate on a public issue. Ireland has used them successfully for referenda on abortion and same-sex marriage, and the model could be adapted state by state in the U.S. to guide Article V Convention delegates.

How could 13 states block a constitutional amendment?

Ratification requires 38 states, so if even a single legislative chamber in each of 13 states votes no, the amendment fails. Preemptive rejection resolutions would let those 13 states announce their veto in advance, forcing the convention to adopt democratic safeguards or risk proposing dead-on-arrival amendments.

Is there a way to make a constitutional convention safe?

Yes. The three-pillar strategy combines delegate binding (legally enforceable after the Supreme Court's 2020 Electors Cases), citizen assemblies (to anchor delegates to popular will), and preemptive rejection resolutions (13 states vetoing in advance any amendment from a convention without democratic safeguards). Together these ensure the convention can only propose amendments with genuine majority support.

What is a preemptive rejection resolution?

A strategy where state legislatures reject amendments from a future convention in advance. If 13 legislatures passed resolutions rejecting any amendment from a convention without democratic safeguards, the convention movement would have to accept those constraints or propose amendments that cannot be ratified.

The Current Movement

Who is behind the push for a constitutional convention?

On the right, the Convention of States (COS) project, backed by the Mercer Family Foundation and Koch-affiliated donors, is one of several groups pushing for a convention. On the left, WolfPAC advocates for a convention focused on campaign finance reform.

What does Convention of States want?

COS seeks amendments restricting the scope and jurisdiction of the federal government, imposing fiscal restraints, and establishing term limits. It is one of several well-funded conservative organizations driving the convention movement.

Are progressives for or against an Article V convention?

Most progressive organizations, including Common Cause, oppose a convention out of fear it could be dominated by the right. Lawrence Lessig and others argue this is a mistake, since the convention is likely coming regardless and disengagement only guarantees progressives have no voice in the process.

Why does Common Cause oppose an Article V convention?

Common Cause fears a runaway convention and has rallied state legislatures to rescind convention applications, including applications designed to address money in politics. Critics of this position argue that rescinding all applications, even those aligned with progressive goals, cedes the entire convention process to the right.

Possible Reforms

Can an Article V convention overturn Citizens United?

Yes, if enough states applied for a convention addressing campaign finance and the convention proposed a relevant amendment. WolfPAC and several state legislatures have already submitted applications specifically targeting the influence of money in politics.

Could a convention impose term limits on Congress?

Yes. Term limits enjoy broad popular support across the political spectrum. A convention-proposed term limits amendment would still need ratification by 38 states.

Is an Article V convention the only way to fix gerrymandering?

Not the only way, but possibly the most realistic path to a constitutional solution. Congress could propose an amendment but has no incentive to do so since gerrymandering benefits incumbents, and a constitutional amendment would be the most durable fix.

What constitutional reforms could an Article V convention address?

Depending on the scope of state applications: fiscal restraints, term limits, campaign finance reform, gerrymandering, an affirmative right to vote, and Electoral College reform. If progressive states submit applications, the range of available topics expands.

Why should progressives engage with the Article V convention rather than oppose it?

The convention movement is well-funded and close to the threshold. The Constitution has structural flaws Congress will never fix: money in politics, gerrymandering, no affirmative right to vote. Refusing to engage does not make the convention less likely. It makes it less democratic.

Detailed Reference

For readers who want deeper context, the following answers expand on the topics above.

Article V Convention: full explanation

An Article V Convention is the second method provided in the U.S. Constitution for proposing amendments. If two-thirds of state legislatures (currently 34 states) apply to Congress, Congress is constitutionally obligated to call a convention for proposing amendments. Any amendments proposed must then be ratified by three-fourths of the states (currently 38) before becoming part of the Constitution. This method has never been used, but the threat of a convention has historically pressured Congress to propose amendments on its own, including the 17th Amendment establishing direct election of senators.

Limiting a convention to one topic: full explanation

This is the most contested question in Article V law and is unresolved. Most commentators and the House Judiciary Committee (in a 1993 study) agree that state applications must address the same issue to be counted toward the 34-state threshold, though they need not share identical language. General issue congruency is sufficient. However, whether a convention, once convened, can actually be confined to its original topic is debated. Courts are unlikely to enjoin a convention from deliberating broadly, for the same judicial restraint reasons that keep courts from dictating congressional proceedings. Under the proposed convention rules drafted by pro-convention state legislators, the convention would require 36 states to agree before proposing any amendment, and could not consider topics not included in at least 34 state applications.

Delegate binding: full explanation

In the 2020 Electors Cases (Chiafalo v. Washington and Colorado v. Baca), the Supreme Court held unanimously that states may bind presidential electors to vote as pledged and may remove electors who threaten to vote contrary to their pledge. Since presidential electors, a position created by the Constitution itself, can be directed by the people's vote, delegates to an Article V Convention can be directed as well. Many states already have laws purporting to bind convention delegates, but the Electors Cases provide the constitutional foundation to make such laws enforceable. Critically, if delegates are bound to reflect the will of the people (rather than the legislature), then the legislature should have no power to override that direction after the fact.

Citizen assemblies: full explanation

Citizen assemblies are randomly selected, representative gatherings of ordinary citizens convened to deliberate on difficult public issues. They have been used successfully around the world, most prominently in Ireland, where citizen assemblies addressed abortion and same-sex marriage and produced recommendations ratified by national referenda. Harvard Law professor Lawrence Lessig has proposed convening citizen assemblies within each state to constrain Article V Convention delegates. Under this proposal, modeled on Stanford professor James Fishkin's deliberative polls, participants would be randomly selected, required to attend (like jurors), fairly compensated, given briefing materials, and allowed to deliberate. States would then require that their convention delegates may not vote to support any amendment whose topic was not supported by at least 60% of the state's citizen assembly. This would bind the convention to majoritarian democracy.

Rescission: full explanation

Whether a state can rescind its Article V application is unresolved. Some constitutional scholars hold that states may withdraw applications without prejudice, so long as the two-thirds threshold of 34 states has not been crossed. Others argue that an application is as binding as a ratification vote, which historically has not been allowed to be rescinded: Congress refused to accept rescissions of 14th Amendment ratifications. The Supreme Court in Coleman v. Miller (1939) treated rescission as a "political question" for Congress to decide. Most constitutional convention procedures bills introduced in Congress during the 1970s through 1990s allowed rescission before the threshold was met. Between 1988 and 2010, 17 state legislatures passed rescission resolutions for previous Article V applications.

Convention of States: full explanation

The Convention of States (COS) project was founded in 2013 by Michael Farris and Mark Meckler. It is one of several conservative organizations pushing for a convention to propose amendments restricting federal power, imposing fiscal restraints, and establishing term limits. COS has received financial support from the Mercer Family Foundation and Koch-affiliated organizations, and is closely aligned with the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC).

The Three-Pillar Strategy for a Democratic Article V Convention

Delegate binding, citizen assemblies, and preemptive rejection: how to ensure a convention reflects the will of the people. By Publius.

The Premise

The Article V Convention is coming. The conservative convention movement is well-funded, well-organized, and close to the 34-state threshold. Progressives, moderates, and democratic reformers face a choice: fight to stop the convention and cede control of the process to the right, or engage with the process and shape it to reflect majoritarian values.

Engagement is the only responsible option. Not because the risks are imaginary (the "runaway convention" fear has a basis in constitutional ambiguity), but because those risks can now be managed. Thanks to a pair of Supreme Court decisions in 2020, the tools exist to constrain an Article V Convention so that it can only propose amendments supported by a genuine democratic majority.

The strategy rests on three pillars, each reinforcing the others.

Pillar 1: Delegate Binding Through the Electors Cases

The Legal Foundation

In 2020, the Supreme Court decided Chiafalo v. Washington and Colorado v. Baca. The question was whether states could compel presidential electors to vote as pledged, or whether electors retained the discretion the framers originally envisioned. The Court held unanimously that states may bind electors. States may remove and replace any elector who threatens to vote contrary to their pledge.

The framers plainly imagined presidential electors exercising independent judgment. But history, the Court concluded, had rendered them differently. Recognizing a state's power to bind its electors, Justice Kagan wrote, "accords with the Constitution, as well as with the trust of a Nation that here, We the People rule."

Application to Article V Delegates

If presidential electors, a position created by the Constitution itself, can be directed by the people's vote, then delegates to an Article V Convention can be directed as well. The logic is straightforward: electors are constitutionally established officers with an originally intended deliberative role, and they can be bound. Convention delegates have no stronger claim to independence.

Many states already have laws that purport to bind convention delegates. Critics, including Feingold and Prindiville in The Constitution in Jeopardy, have dismissed these laws as "toothless" because they don't stop a state legislature from changing its mind and redirecting delegates after a convention is called. But this critique misses the critical possibility that the Electors Cases illuminate.

The Key Move: Binding to the People, Not the Legislature

If a state legislature directs its delegates to reflect the will of the people (through a citizen assembly, a popular referendum, or a binding vote), then the legislature itself should have no power to change how delegates must vote after the fact. The principle is the same as with presidential electors: if a legislature gives the people the vote and one candidate wins, the legislature cannot then override that result by directing electors to vote for the losing candidate.

"Here, We the People rule" must mean that once the people have spoken, the people's choice is binding. The legislature cannot take it back.

This is the foundation of the entire strategy. If delegates are bound to the people rather than to the legislature, the convention becomes democratic by construction.

Pillar 2: Citizen Assemblies

The Model

Across the world, citizen assemblies have emerged as a powerful mechanism for resolving questions that ordinary politics cannot handle. The most prominent examples are from Ireland, where randomly selected citizen assemblies addressed abortion and same-sex marriage. Their conclusions were wildly popular, ratified by national referenda, and impossible to imagine the ordinary Irish legislature producing.

The assemblies work because they combine representation with deliberation. Participants are not activists or partisans. They are ordinary people, randomly selected to be statistically representative of the population, given balanced information, and allowed to discuss and argue before reaching conclusions.

How It Would Work for Article V

The proposal, advanced by Lawrence Lessig and drawing on the deliberative polling methodology of Stanford professor James Fishkin, works as follows:

Each participating state would convene a citizen assembly: a large, randomly selected, representative sample of the state's population. Like jurors, participants would be required to attend. Unlike jurors, they would be compensated fairly. Not the $15-per-day insult of jury duty, but genuine compensation: travel expenses, government per diem, lost wages, job protection, and a meaningful bonus for participation.

Participants would receive briefing materials in advance covering the constitutional amendments and topics under consideration. They would then meet and deliberate in both small and large groups over an extended period. At the conclusion, they would vote on which amendments or topics they support.

The Binding Rule

The state legislature would then pass a law providing that: "No delegate from the State of [X] may vote to support a proposed amendment whose topic at least 60 percent of the state's Citizen Assembly did not support."

That single rule transforms the convention. Delegates are no longer free agents. They are not instruments of the legislature. They are bound to reflect the deliberated will of a representative sample of their state's population. Combined with the Electors Cases' holding that such binding is constitutionally enforceable, this creates a convention constrained by majoritarian democracy.

Why Extremists Won't Dominate

Some will resist citizen assemblies for fear they would be captured by extremists. This concern is mistaken. If the assembly is randomly selected and genuinely representative, extremists would constitute a tiny minority, because they are a tiny minority of America. The entire point of random selection is that it reproduces the actual distribution of views in the population. A citizen assembly is not a town hall; it is not self-selected; it does not reward the loudest voices. It is a structured, deliberative body that reflects the country as it actually is.

Pillar 3: Preemptive Rejection Resolutions

The Arithmetic of Ratification

No amendment, however proposed, can become part of the Constitution without the approval of 38 states. Conversely, a single legislative chamber in each of just 13 states can block any amendment. This veto power is normally exercised after a convention proposes something. But there is no constitutional requirement that it be exercised only after the fact.

The Strategy

Imagine that a state legislature passes a resolution along these lines: "The State of [X] hereby preemptively rejects any amendment proposed by an Article V Convention that does not entrench the voice of the People in both the convention and ratification process."

The resolution would not dictate that every state create a citizen assembly. Assemblies are ideal, but the resolution would accept other mechanisms (popular referenda, elected and pledged delegates to ratifying conventions) so long as convention delegates are constrained by some form of popular input rather than legislative discretion alone.

Why 13 States Changes Everything

If 13 state legislatures passed such resolutions, the politics of the convention would transform fundamentally. No one knows whether preemptive rejections have ultimate legal force (they have never been tested). But their political force would be enormous.

These 13 states would be sending an unmistakable signal to the convention movement: abide by democratic checks, or your amendments will be stillborn. Why would any rational convention organizer spend years mobilizing 34 states to call a convention, only to propose amendments that 13 states have already promised to block?

The rational response is to accept the democratic constraints. And in doing so, the convention movement would embed majoritarian values into the process from the very beginning, before a single delegate is selected, before a single vote is cast.

The Feedback Loop

The three pillars reinforce each other. Preemptive rejection resolutions create the political pressure to adopt citizen assemblies and delegate binding. Citizen assemblies give the delegate-binding mechanism its democratic legitimacy. And the Electors Cases make the entire structure legally enforceable. Remove any one pillar and the strategy weakens. Together, they create a self-reinforcing architecture for a democratic convention.

What This Makes Possible

If these safeguards are in place, an Article V Convention becomes something it has never been before: a vehicle for genuine constitutional reform with democratic legitimacy.

The Constitution as currently interpreted has structural flaws that Congress will never fix. The corrupting dependence on money in politics. Weaponized gerrymandering. The absence of an affirmative right to vote. A presidential election system that makes most voters irrelevant. The lack of meaningful term limits. These are not partisan issues. Polling consistently shows supermajority support for these reforms across the political spectrum.

But Congress is the obstacle. Congress benefits from the current system. That is precisely the scenario George Mason warned about in 1787 when he insisted the Constitution include a mechanism for proposing amendments that Congress could not control.

The Article V Convention is that mechanism. The three-pillar strategy is how we ensure it serves the people rather than the factions that first set it in motion. The tools exist. The legal precedent is established. The question is whether we use them.